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Moore v. British Columbia: A Good
IDEA?
Robert E. Charney and Sarah Kraicer∗

I. INTRODUCTION
In Moore v. British Columbia (Education),1 the Supreme Court of
Canada was faced with the question of whether the special education
program provided by a British Columbia District School Board to Jeffrey
Moore, a student with severe learning disabilities (“SLD”), infringed the
British Columbia Human Rights Code,2 and, if it did, what the appropriate remedy was under the Code. At first instance the Human Rights
Tribunal3 found both individual and systemic discrimination. It concluded that the District School Board had failed to provide Jeffrey and
other SLD students with the level of support needed, and that the Ministry of Education provided inadequate funding for SLD students and
failed to appropriately monitor the delivery of special education services
provided by the school district. The Tribunal ordered damages and systemic remedies against both the District School Board and the Ministry
of Education. The damages award included reimbursement of the costs of
tuition and partial transportation paid for Jeffrey to attend private schools
∗
General Counsel and Counsel respectively, Constitutional Law Branch, Ministry of the
Attorney General of Ontario. The authors were counsel for the Attorney General of Ontario, which
intervened in the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore v. British Columbia (Education), [2012] S.C.J.
No. 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360 (S.C.C.). The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors,
and do not represent the position of the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario. The authors are
grateful to Janet Pounder for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to Padraic
Ryan and Sarah Morton for their research assistance.
1
[2012] S.C.J. No. 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Moore SCC”].
2
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210.
3
Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education), [2005] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 580, 54
C.H.R.R. D/245 [hereinafter “Moore BCHRT”].
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up to and including the end of Grade 12. The systemic remedies required
the Ministry to rewrite the funding methodology for special education,
and to centralize oversight of individual special education programs
within the Ministry of Education.
The Tribunal’s decision was reversed by the British Columbia
courts,4 which found that there had been no discrimination against Jeffrey because he had been provided with the same or better special
education program as any other SLD student in the province.
The Supreme Court of Canada “substantially allowed”5 the appeal,
reinstating the Tribunal’s damages award against the District School
Board, but rejecting both the damages award and the systemic remedies
that had been ordered against the Ministry of Education.
In considering the Supreme Court decision in Moore, we will divide
our analysis into three parts. The first will be a general consideration of
private school vouchers in Canada and the United States, because we are
of the view that this consideration is relevant to both the substantive and
remedial issues confronting courts in cases involving accommodation in
the public school system. The second part is consideration of the substantive question of whether Jeffrey had been discriminated against by the
District School Board or the Ministry. The third is whether, assuming
that the District School Board had failed to accommodate Jeffrey, the
damages order upheld by the Supreme Court was appropriate in the circumstances. While we are in general agreement with the Supreme
Court’s mode of analysis of the substantive question, and agree with its
dismissal of the systemic remedies against the Ministry, we take issue
with the damages award made against the District School Board.

II. PRIVATE SCHOOL VOUCHERS
Public funding of private schools has been a hotly contested political
issue across Canada. Parents who are dissatisfied with the public school
system promote the public funding of private schools on the basis of parental choice, religious or cultural diversity, and/or the premise that
greater competition will lead to better schools. Different provinces have
4
British Columbia (Ministry of Education) v. Moore, [2008] B.C.J. No. 348, 81 B.C.L.R.
(4th) 107 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Moore SC”]; and British Columbia (Ministry of Education) v.
Moore, [2010] B.C.J. No. 2097, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 246 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Moore CA”].
5
Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 71.
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responded to these arguments with different education policies. Some,
like Ontario, limit public funding to the public school system;6 others,
like British Columbia and Quebec, provide limited funding to private
schools and impose strict limits and eligibility criteria on this funding.7
No province in Canada funds private schools on an equal basis with public schools, and no province in Canada has followed the example of some
American states of offering parents a “voucher” to cover the cost of private school tuition. Certainly no province in Canada has decided to
provide more funding to private schools than to public schools.
In Canada, the political consensus remains that public dollars should
primarily, or exclusively, focus on building a public school system that is
open and accessible to all students in the community. The importance of
this government objective has been recognized by the courts, which have
rejected Charter8-based claims to funding for private schools based on
religion, ethnicity and language.9 While parents have the right to send
their children to private schools, there is no constitutional right to public
funding of private schools. The decision whether to fund private schools,
or to offer tuition vouchers to parents who opt out of the public school
system, is a policy choice for government to make.
Americans have taken a somewhat different approach to private school
funding, and, based on a combination of philosophical and historical
factors, have been more receptive to public funding of private schools.
Some of this sympathy for private school funding is likely a result of the
American distrust of government monopolies and a preference for a
private enterprise model. The same laissez-faire political philosophy that
6
This policy is complicated in Ontario by s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31
Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), which guarantees public funding to Roman Catholic Separate Schools, which
are thereby part of the public school system in Ontario (Reference re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the
Education Act (Ontario), [1987] S.C.J. No. 44, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 (S.C.C.)). Like public
schools, the separate schools are governed by elected school boards under the Education Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2 [hereinafter “Ontario Education Act”], Part IV. Throughout this paper the
term “public school system” is meant to refer to schools governed or managed by an elected
school board.
7
British Columbia: Independent Schools Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 216 and Independent
School Regulation, B.C. Reg. 262/89, as am. B.C. Reg. 90/2011, at ss. 3-4; Quebec: An Act
Respecting Private Education, R.S.Q. c. E-9.1, Chapter V (Subsidies), Div. I- IV.
8
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
9
See, e.g., Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.); Bal
v. Ontario, [1997] O.J. No. 2597, 34 O.R. (3d) 484 (Ont. C.A.); Cooper v. Ontario (Attorney
General), [2009] O.J. No. 3589, 311 D.L.R. (4th) 480 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
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made the Obama administration’s proposal for public health insurance so
controversial in the United States influences their view of the delivery of
education.10 Certain efforts to provide state funding to private schools can
be traced to America’s troubled history of racial segregation. As the United
States courts ordered the desegregation of the public school system,
recalcitrant state legislatures tried to circumvent the court rulings by
offering parents private school vouchers so they could opt out of the
desegregated public school system.11 Other states offered private school
vouchers in an effort to provide financial support to religious schools and
thereby circumvent the establishment of religion clause in the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits states from
establishing programs that have the “primary effect” of advancing
religion.12
Funding private schools is one approach that the United States has
taken to provide special education programs for students whose mental
or physical disabilities require special accommodation. The federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)13 establishes the
standards that school districts must meet in order to receive federal funding for the education of students with disabilities. IDEA provides that
students with disabilities are entitled to a “free and appropriate public
education” (“FAPE”) set out in an individualized education plan (“IEP”)
developed with parental input to meet the child’s special education
needs. School districts can meet their obligations under IDEA by providing a FAPE at a public school or by referring a student to a private

10
Consistent with this, Sarah Palin, the Republican Vice-Presidential nominee for 2008,
advocated changing the federal regulations to enable federal education funding to be “fully portable
to any public or private school elected by the parents”. In contrast, Barack Obama went on record in
opposition to “using public money for private school[s]” during his campaign. Wendy F. Hensel,
“Vouchers for Students with Disabilities: The Future of Special Education?” (2010) 39 J.L. & Educ.
291, at 310 [hereinafter “Hensel”].
11
See Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), in
which the Supreme Court found that closing public schools and providing grants of public funds for
children to attend private schools was an unconstitutional scheme to avoid desegregation.
12
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 93 S. Ct.
2995 (1973), invalidating a New York program that was found “unmistakably to provide desired
financial support for non-public, sectarian institutions”, at 773-74. Such vouchers are permissible,
however, where the program is neutral with respect to religion and provides assistance to religious
institutions “only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients”: Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
13
84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq. (this statute was previously entitled the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (1975)).
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special education program at public expense.14 In addition, the United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the court’s broad remedial authority
under IDEA as authorizing courts to order reimbursement of private
school tuition and expenses in cases where the parents unilaterally withdrew their child from the public school because the school’s special
education services did not meet the child’s needs. The Supreme Court
held that “when a public school fails to provide a FAPE and a child’s
parents place the child in an appropriate private school without the
school district’s consent, a court may require the district to reimburse the
parents for the cost of the private education”.15 This authority to order
reimbursement of private school tuition may be applied even in cases
where the child has never attended a public school.16
In addition to the federally mandated IDEA, three states provide universal vouchers for all students with disabilities, and a number of other
states have proposed similar legislation.17
There are obvious public policy implications to requiring public
school boards to cover the cost of private school for students with disabilities, and the impact of these vouchers on the public system in the
United States remains controversial.18 The most significant impact is financial: public school funds, whether generated from grants or local
property taxes, are spent by public school boards for the benefit of all
students in the public system. As the number of children attending private school at public expense increases, the funds available to educate
students with disabilities in public schools decreases.19 Capital improvements like ramps and elevators, and equipment such as specialized
software, lifting devices and hearing support equipment, are not the
property of individual students, but remain part of the board’s investment
for future students with similar disability-related needs. Professional
staff, including special education teachers and teaching assistants, even
14

In contrast, Ontario school boards have no authority to spend board funds on private
school tuition: see Ontario Education Act, supra, note 6, s. 170(1)7 and text at footnote 70 below.
15
School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359,
at 370, 105 S. Ct. 1996 [hereinafter “Burlington”]; Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 557 U.S.
230 at 232, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009) [hereinafter “Forest Grove”].
16
Forest Grove, id.
17
Hensel, supra, note 10. Hensel indicates that Florida, Utah and Georgia provide
“universal special needs vouchers”, and a fourth state, Ohio, provides a voucher only for children
with autism and autism spectrum disorder (at 299).
18
Id., at 294.
19
Id., at 318.
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when assigned to individual students, are available as a resource for other
teachers and students in the class or school. Specialized staff training
enables public schools to develop institutional expertise for the benefit of
current and future students. Requiring public funding of private schools
redirects scarce resources from the public system. It does nothing to enhance the capacity of public schools to accommodate the special
education needs of students with disabilities and may ultimately undermine the ability of public school boards to fulfil their public education
mandate, including the provision of special education services and programs for students with special education needs.20
If the public policy goal is to make public schools accessible to
students with disabilities, then resources must be focused on making
public schools accessible to students with disabilities, not on providing
access to private schools. To use a simplistic example, if a public school
is inaccessible to a disabled student because it does not have a ramp, the
solution is not to require the public school to pay for that student to
attend a private school with a ramp; the solution is to order the public
school to build a ramp.
As will be seen when we examine the Moore case, however, the issue
is never as simplistic as the ramp example given above. School boards
rarely, if ever, simply refuse to provide any accommodation.21 The issue,

20
Similar concerns have been stated by the Florida Supreme Court, which invalidated an
earlier version of the Florida voucher program as being inconsistent with art. IX, s. 1(a) of the
Florida state constitution, which guarantees a “uniform system of public free schools” and “the
liberal maintenance of such system of free schools”. The Court stated:
It diverts public dollars into separate private systems parallel to and in competition with
the free public schools that are the sole means set out in the Constitution for the state to
provide for the education of Florida’s children. This diversion not only reduces money
available to the free schools, but also funds private schools that are not “uniform” when
compared with each other or the public system. Many standards imposed by law on the
public schools are inapplicable to the private schools receiving public monies.
Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, at 399 (2006). Discussed in Hensel, supra, note 10, at 311-12.
21
All school boards in Canada are obliged by statute to provide special education programs
for their students: British Columbia: School Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 412, s. 168(2)(a) [hereinafter
“B.C. School Act”]; Individual Education Plan Order, Ministerial Order M638/95, December 18,
1995, s. 2(1). Alberta: School Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-3, s. 47(2) (new legislation was enacted in 2012
and is awaiting proclamation). Saskatchewan: The Education Act, 1995, S.S. 1995, c. E-0.2,
s. 178(8). Manitoba: The Public Schools Act, C.C.S.M. c. P250, s. 41(1)(a.1). Ontario: Ontario
Education Act, supra, note 6, s. 170(1)7. Quebec: Education Act, R.S.Q. c. I-13.3, s. 244 [hereinafter
“Quebec Education Act”]. New Brunswick: Education Act, S.N.B. 1997, c. E-1.12, s. 12. Nova
Scotia: Education Act, S.N.S. 1995-96, c. 1, s. 64(2)(d). Prince Edward Island: School Act, R.S.P.E.I.
1988, c. S-2.1, s. 7(1)(e). Newfoundland: Schools Act, 1997, S.N.L. 1997, c. S-12.2, s. 75(1)(d).
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rather, is how to measure the adequacy of the accommodation that the
school board does provide. Is it measured against the optimum program
recommended by experts? If this is the standard, it is unlikely that it
could be met by any public education programs, whether typical or special. Or is it whether the special education program offered by the public
school is “as good as” the program offered by the best private school?
This is an issue that presents itself to all parents, whether or not their
children have special education needs, who consider whether to place
their child in a private school. Or is it an expectation that the accommodation will put the student in the position she would have been in had she
not had a disability “by comparing the achievement of a disabled student
to the achievement of his or her nondisabled peers”,22 a standard of accommodation that may not be possible to meet for children with certain
complex disabilities including some cognitive disabilities? Or is it an
expectation that the accommodation will provide an equivalent opportunity to access the program offered in public school to non-disabled
students,23 however that is to be measured?
Moore arose under the British Columbia Human Rights Code, which
prohibits discrimination in the provision of services customarily available to the public. As the challenge was framed as a matter of discrimination, the standard to measure adequacy of the accommodation had to bear
some relationship to “equality”. The proper comparison for the equality
analysis was, in part, where the Supreme Court of Canada disagreed with
the British Columbia courts. Significantly, American jurisprudence has
expressly rejected “equality” as the appropriate standard to be applied
under IDEA, stating that this would “present an entirely unworkable
standard requiring impossible measurement and comparisons”:

Yukon: Education Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 61, s. 15. Northwest Territories: Education Act, S.N.W.T.
1995, c. 28, s. 7. Nunavut: Education Act, S. Nu. 2008, c. 15, s. 41(1).
22
Judith Deberry, “Comment: When Parents and Educators Clash: Are Special Education
Students Entitled to a Cadillac Education?”(2003) 34 St. Mary’s L.J. 503, at 524, 534 [hereinafter
“Deberry”].
23
See Mark C. Weber, “Common-Law Interpretation of Appropriate Education: The Road
Not Taken in Rowley” (2012) 41 J.L. & Educ. 95, at 110-15. Requiring the provision of an
education that enables a child with a disability to “achieve his or her full potential” would fail to
recognize that “even the best public schools rarely have the resources to enable every child to reach
his or her full potential” (at 115).
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The educational opportunities provided by our public school systems
undoubtedly differ from student to student, depending upon a myriad of
factors that might affect a particular student’s ability to assimilate
information presented in the classroom. The requirement that States
provide “equal” educational opportunities would thus seem to present
an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements
and comparisons … The theme of the Act is “free appropriate public
education,” a phrase which is too complex to be captured by the word
“equal” whether one is speaking of opportunities or services.24

Instead, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted FAPE as
requiring only that the program offer “some educational benefit”; as long
as a disabled child is receiving “some educational benefit” from his or
her education, the requirement of FAPE will be met.25 While access to
education must be made meaningful, this does not require a school board
to maximize the potential of disabled students commensurate with the
opportunity provided other students, or to provide a specified program
even if it may offer superior results.26 This limited duty in turn limits the
potential liability of school boards to pay for private schools under
IDEA. The question is whether the standard of accommodation established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore is more demanding
than the standard under IDEA, potentially making public payment of private school tuition more available in Canada than it is in the United
States.

III. MOORE V. BRITISH COLUMBIA
At first blush, Moore v. British Columbia does not appear to be about
public funding of private schools. In our view, however, the Human
Rights Tribunal remedy upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada, with
virtually no comment and no examination of its implications, is exactly
that: a voucher for private school tuition. The remedy ordered in that case
— reimbursement of nine years of private school tuition (from Grades 4
to 12) — bears no relation to the perceived inadequacy of the special

24
Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, at 198-99 (1982).
25
Id., at 201-202. For a general discussion of the Rowley case and its progeny, see T. Daris
Isbell, “Making Up for Lost Educational Opportunities” (2010-2011) 76 Brook. L.R. 1717, at 1728-49.
26
Deberry, supra, note 22, at 534-35.
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education program actually offered by the school board in this case, nor
did it accomplish its purported goal of providing access to the public
education system. This remedy has profound implications beyond the
interests of the individual student and the impact of a single order for
payment of private school tuition. As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Moore, private school tuition payment orders have the potential
to become a widely sought alternative to accommodation within the public school system.
1. Human Rights Tribunal Decision
The Moore case concerned a student, Jeffrey, with a severe learning
disability (dyslexia) that prevented him from learning to read and write
through standard teaching methods. He attended the public school system
from kindergarten to Grade 3, where, as a result of several assessments,
various special supports were provided to help him to learn to read and
write. In Grades 1 and 2 these supports included individual help from a
teaching aide and attending a Learning Assistance Centre three times a
week for half-hour individual sessions with a learning assistance teacher
and a volunteer tutor. He continued to make poor progress in Grades 1
and 2, and underwent a full psycho-educational assessment in Grade 2.
Following this assessment the school board psychologist “concluded that
Jeffrey needed more intensive remediation than he had been receiving
and suggested that he attend the Diagnostic Centre”.27
The Diagnostic Centre (“DC1”) was operated by the District School
Board from 1976 to 1994, and offered intensive remediation to severely
learning disabled students. It consisted of three teachers and up to 18
learning disabled students who were enrolled in a segregated program for
three or four months in one of the DC1 classes. In addition, the DC1
teachers would work one day per week with classroom and learning
assistance teachers after the student returned to his or her home school. This
follow-up continued for two years. The District was the only one in British
Columbia to offer a segregated program for students with dyslexia.28
Jeffrey Moore did not attend the DC1 in Grade 3, however, because
the District School Board closed it that year. Instead he was provided

27
28

Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at para. 13.
Moore SC, supra, note 4, at para. 21.
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with approximately five hours per week of individual special education
supports in his current school consisting of two 30-minute sessions of
individual instruction in the Learning Assistance Centre, two 40-minute
periods of individual assistance with a tutor in the Learning Assistance
Centre, and four 40-minute sessions per week of individual instruction
from a teacher’s aide in the classroom. After Jeffrey completed Grade 3,
the Moores withdrew him from the public school and placed him at
Kenneth Gordon School, a private school specializing in teaching
students with learning disabilities from Grades 4 to 7. Jeffrey Moore
never returned to public school, and graduated from Grade 12 at the
Fraser Academy, another private school specializing in children with
disabilities.29
The evidence before the Tribunal was that the District School Board
closed the DC1 in 1995 for financial reasons. The DC1 cost the Board
$292,500 per year to operate. The District School Board blamed its
decision to close the DC1 on “underfunding” by the province. The Board
did not consider the DC1 model to be financially sustainable, and, given
the philosophy of integration or inclusion,30 expected that the services
provided by the DC1 could be provided in the neighbourhood schools
through individual support from specialized aides in the classroom.31
The central legal question was whether Jeffrey had been discriminated against contrary to section 8 of the British Columbia Human Rights
Code because he had been denied a “service … customarily available to
the public” on the basis of disability.32
The Tribunal held that the special education program offered by the
school board after the closure of the DC1 was not sufficient for Jeffrey’s
needs, and “concluded that there was both individual and systemic
discrimination against Jeffrey and systemic discrimination against Severe
29

Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at paras. 15, 16.
The evidence before the Tribunal did not support segregated facilities for SLD students,
but indicated that the critical issue was level of support provided regardless of the location. Moore
SC, supra, note 4, at paras. 14, 68. At the time these facts arose, many parents of children with
disabilities were advocating for integrated settings as the presumptive placement required by Charter
s. 15(1). See Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1996] S.C.J. No. 98, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eaton”].
31
Moore SC, id., at paras. 68-70.
32
Section 8 of the British Columbia Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, states that
it is discriminatory if a “person … without a bona fide and reasonable justification … den[ies] to a
person or class of persons any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the
public” on the basis of a prohibited ground.
30
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Learning Disabilities (“SLD”) students in general”.33 It ordered that the
Moores be reimbursed for the costs related to Jeffrey’s attendance at
private schools (tuition and half his transportation costs) from Grade 4
until the end of Grade 12. Both the District School Board and the
Ministry of Education were held responsible for these damages; the
District School Board because, inter alia, it did not follow its own staff’s
recommendation that Jeffrey attend the DC1 and it did not ensure that,
following the closure of the DC1, other sufficiently intense and effective
interventions were in place to replace it. While the Tribunal expressed
sympathy for the Board’s “compelling”34 financial circumstances, it
nonetheless concluded that the District School Board had failed to
“reasonably consider a range of alternatives to meet the needs of SLD
students before cutting available services”.35 Among the alternatives it
failed to consider was cutting funding to the District School Board’s
“Outdoor School”, which was a program available to all District students
but “was not part of the core educational services”.36
With respect to the Ministry, the Tribunal concluded that it had failed
to provide adequate funding to the District School Board and had failed to
monitor the Board’s decisions to ensure that the appropriate special education programs were available to SLD students. Accordingly, it found
that the Ministry was jointly and severally liable for the damages award.
The Tribunal also ordered what it called “systemic remedies” against
the Ministry. These remedies gave the Ministry one year to:
a)

make available funding for SLD students at actual incidence
levels;

b) establish mechanisms for determining that the support and
accommodation services delivered to SLD students are appropriate
and meet the stated goals of the School Act and the Special Needs
Student Order;

33

Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 20.
Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at para. 931. The Board was permitted to run a deficit of
$1.8 million in 1991/92 on the condition that it balance its budget by 1994. It began the 1994/95
school year with a $1.12 million deficit, Moore SC, supra, note 4, at paras. 64–66.
35
Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at para. 938.
36
Moore BCHRT, id. The Tribunal also concluded that the District School Board had failed
to assess Jeffrey at an earlier stage, although this finding was quashed by the British Columbia
Supreme Court and this part of the BCSC’s decision was not appealed and was therefore not before
the SCC, Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 40.
34
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ensure that all districts have in place early intervention programs
so that SLD students can be identified early and appropriate
intensive remediation services provided; and

d) ensure that all school districts have in place a range of services to
meet the needs of SLD students.37

While it made these systemic orders, the Tribunal declined to “direct how
the Ministry is to comply with the above orders”.38
2. British Columbia Courts
The British Columbia Supreme Court allowed the application for judicial review. The Court found that Jeffrey “should be compared to other
special needs students, not to the general student population as the Tribunal had done”.39 There was no evidence that Jeffrey had been
discriminated against as compared to other students who required special
education programs,40 and therefore the finding of differential treatment
had not been established. A majority of the Court of Appeal confirmed
the British Columbia Supreme Court’s ruling, agreeing that the appropriate comparator group was other special needs students, not the general
student population. In this regard, the Court of Appeal noted that “Jeffrey
Moore received more special education services than any other student in
his school”.41 Neither court found it necessary to consider the Tribunal’s
remedial orders since they both rejected the finding of discrimination.

37

Moore BCHRT, id., at para. 1015.
Id., at para. 1016.
39
Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 23. See Moore SC, supra, note 4, at paras. 131, 139:
“Did other special needs students receive supports or accommodations that Moore did not receive?”
40
Moore SC, id., at para. 147:
There is no basis upon which this Court could infer that other special needs students were
provided with special education programs so unique to their needs that academic literature was scrutinized for options to promote individual potential and then those optimal
new programs were implemented regardless of whether they had been integrated into
teacher education or the general public education plan.
41
Moore CA, supra, note 4, at para. 75.
38
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3. Supreme Court of Canada
(a) Substantive Analysis
The Supreme Court described the “central issue” in this case as
“what the relevant ‘service … customarily available to the public’
was”.42 While the Tribunal and the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal defined the service as “general” education, the reviewing judge and
the Court of Appeal majority defined it as “special” education. Justice
Abella agreed with the former, noting that “for students with learning
disabilities … special education is not a service, it is the means by which
those students get meaningful access to the general education services
available to all British Columbia students”.43 While we are in agreement
with this analysis, it is important to qualify this description of the service
by noting that the service is not just a “general education”, but a general
public school education, a factor which should be relevant at each stage
of the equality and remedial analysis.
While comparing the special education program that Jeffrey was getting to the special education programs available to other students with
disabilities may be a relevant consideration, we agree with the Supreme
Court of Canada that it cannot be the primary basis of the comparison in
this case. As Abella J. recognizes, limiting the analysis exclusively to this
comparison would permit the District School Board to “cut all special
needs programs and yet be immune from a claim of discrimination”.44
The fact that a student or group of students has received the same or even
more services than other students with disabilities does not tell us
whether any of those students have been appropriately accommodated
through an equitable allocation of the resources available to the board.
Students who require more support should receive more accommodation
than students who need less support, and the mere fact that a student gets
more than others does not foreclose the inquiry into whether what that
student has received is appropriate. On the other hand, there is always a
concern that a Human Rights Tribunal (or a court) will focus exclusively

42
Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 27, quoting from s. 8 of the British Columbia Human
Rights Code (see supra, note 32).
43
Moore, SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 28.
44
Id., at para. 30 (emphasis in original).
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on the complainant before it,45 and assess the duty to accommodate without regard to the competing needs of other disabled students who are not
parties to the claim. All of these cases would be relatively simple if the
school board had only one special education student to accommodate.
Having determined that the service in question is general education,
the Court held that the standard required by the Code was “[m]eaningful
access to the educational opportunities offered by the Board”.46 In describing what this standard means in the context of special education, the
Court referred to the familiar example of a ramp as a metaphor for all
special education services. But the ramp analogy is of limited assistance
in answering the difficult questions of what is required to achieve “meaningful access” for students with learning disabilities and other disabilities
that require accommodation to the educational program itself. A ramp
simply removes a physical barrier to accessing the same school building,
programs and services that other students use. It does not give better access, or better or different programs and services to those who use it. It
can be difficult to draw the line between what is an accommodation that
must be given to provide “meaningful access” to a service available to
all, and what is a special, different or enhanced service that government
may choose to give in allocating resources among deserving groups. As
the Court held in Eldridge, the right to “meaningful access” to medical
and hospital services required the provision of sign-language interpretation, but not hearing aids, as that would be a discrete service or product
that would go beyond ensuring access to the particular service at issue
and instead “alleviate general disadvantage”.47
The Court gave mixed signals about what the standard of “meaningful access” requires in the context of special education. On the one hand,
it stated that what is required is “adequate” special education, and that is
not measured by the result that the student achieves, as a board may have
45
Donna Greschner & Steven Lewis, “Auton and Evidence-Based Decision Making:
Medicare and Courts” (2003) 82 Can. Bar Rev. 501, at 507-508:
[G]overnment departments are better equipped than courts to manage complex programs
and use resources effectively … Moreover , they have the major advantage of perspective: they not only can, but must consider the needs of all patients, compare the
sometimes incommensurable and make often tragic trade-offs. In contrast, courts run a
higher risk of telescopic vision: focussing on the case before them magnifies that case,
and removes other needs and problems from their field of vision.
46
Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 4.
47
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R.
624, at paras. 78, 92 (S.C.C.).
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done what was necessary to give access, “yet the hoped-for results did
not follow”.48 Nor is it determined by whether broad, aspirational policy
statements of governments or boards have been met; these “may not reflect realistic objectives” and therefore “a margin of deference is, as a
result, owed to governments and administrators in implementing these
broad, aspirational polices”.49
On the other hand, the Court also referred to Tribunal findings that
certain programs “would have benefitted” Jeffrey and were not available.
The Court also appeared to support the view that the District School
Board ought to have sacrificed the Outdoor School and retained the
Diagnostic Centre, as “specialized and discretionary initiatives cannot be
compared with the accommodations necessary in order to make the core
curriculum accessible to severely learning disabled students”.50
The Court did qualify this statement by indicating that the more
significant flaw in the Board’s decision-making was that it undertook no
assessment of what alternatives would be available if the Diagnostic
Centre were to close.51 This aspect of the Court decision recognizes the
reality that every transfer payment agency can legitimately make a claim
to having a “funding shortfall”, but cannot use this as an excuse to
allocate its available resources in a discriminatory way. The Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision indicates that, at the very least, this requires
the District School Board to enter into a genuine process to properly
consider the consequences of its allocation decision, and suggests that
had the Board actually given proper consideration to these consequences
and still come to the same conclusion, the result of the case may well
have been different. In this regard, it is important to remember that the
facts of this case arose in 1994-1995, and school boards and other public
institutions have (we hope) come a long way since then in ensuring that
their decision-making process takes into account their obligations to
accommodate persons with disabilities. As a 2012 judicial review of a
1994 school board decision, the Moore case may prove to be little more
than an anachronism.
If “meaningful access” required the provision of all special education
programs or services that “would benefit” a student, it would not only
48
49
50
51

Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 35.
Id.
Id., at para. 51, quoting Rowles J.A. in Moore CA, supra, note 4, at para. 154.
Id., at paras. 46 and 52.
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impose unlimited and unrealizable requirements on Boards, but would
also bear no relation to the public education service available in the public system, which does not provide students with all programs that would
benefit them. While we do not suggest that the Supreme Court has endorsed this extreme view, if “meaningful access” means that all non-core
programs must be eliminated before cuts are made to special education
programs, this could severely impact a Board’s ability to allocate its
funds among all programs. Given the undefined and potentially unlimited
demand for special education services, this could have a significant effect
on arts, music, physical education and other “non-core programs” that
benefit all students of the Board. This extreme scenario illustrates the
difficulties with this kind of discrimination standard, which would require human rights tribunals to delve deeply into education policy and
funding allocation decisions and would require findings about the benefits of so-called non-core, core and special education programs for all
students, including students receiving special education services, as part
of the general education program.
In Moore, certain “bad facts” found by the Tribunal and relied on by
the Supreme Court (these findings of fact were not the subject of the
appeal to the Supreme Court) gave a strong evidentiary basis for the
Court’s finding that the programs and services offered by the District
School Board to Jeffrey after the closure of the Diagnostic Centre were
“far from adequate”. Those findings, supported by the testimony of
District School Board employees, were that Jeffrey required intensive
remediation, that the services available through the District provided
insufficient intensive remediation to meet his needs, and that such
services were only available in private schools. The strong adverse factual
findings about the insufficiency of the services available to Jeffrey, given
his needs, grounded the Court’s conclusion that, in this case, Jeffrey had
been denied meaningful access to general education available to other
students. The Court has otherwise provided very little guidance on the
very difficult and education policy-laden question of what will constitute
“inadequate” special education that denies “meaningful access” to the
publicly funded general education system. Parents and school boards may
well disagree on what these inchoate standards require in individual cases.
We hope that in interpreting and applying these standards in the future,
the broader education policy issues that public schools face in delivering
meaningful education to all students, including students with special
education needs, will be given their proper consideration.
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(b) Remedial Analysis
(i) Damages
The Supreme Court upheld the damages claim against the District
School Board52 with virtually no analysis, stating simply that remedial
decisions by the Tribunal are subject to a standard of patent unreasonableness, and that “this order ... is sustainable given the actual scope of
the complaint”.53 There are, however, in our view, several serious concerns with this damages award, both as a matter of principle and as an
assessment of quantum.
Our first concern is that the damages remedy transforms the Human
Rights Code into a provincial equivalent of the United States IDEA statute by authorizing a Human Rights Tribunal to “require the district to
reimburse the parents for the cost of the private education”.54 The decision whether to fund private schools or offer tuition vouchers to parents
who opt out of the public school system is a policy choice for governments to make. As indicated above, all provinces in Canada have decided
to dedicate all or the bulk of public education funding to the public
school system as the best way to ensure that public schools have the resources available to provide educational programs to all students,
including students with special education needs. The damages remedy
permits the Tribunal to circumvent the thrust of provincial education policy and creates a private school “voucher” that will siphon resources
from the public school system.
There is a second principled objection to remedying the public
school system’s inadequate accommodation through private school tuition reimbursement. Private schools may provide enhanced programs,
services, ancillary benefits and facilities that are not available in any public school, and that may not be “accommodation” for a student’s
disability-based needs. As a result, the tuition charged to parents in private schools may far exceed the per-student funding available to all other

52
The amount of tuition to attend private school up to and including Grade 12, one-half the
costs incurred for transportation to those schools and $10,000 for “the injury to dignity, feelings and
self-respect”: Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at para. 1022.
53
Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 55. For a discussion of the meaning of the phrase
“patent unreasonableness”, see Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R.
190 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunsmuir”], and discussion at note 93, infra.
54
Burlington, supra, note 15, at 370; Forest Grove, supra, note 15, at 232.
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students, with or without special needs, in public schools. Ordering payment of private school tuition imposes a standard of accommodation that
bears no relationship with the education provided to students in the public school system. Instead of reasonably accommodating a student’s
needs within the multiple demands and fiscal and human resource limits
and constraints of the public school system, a private school tuition payment voucher gives the student a different kind of education benefit that
is not equivalent to what other public school students receive.
Private schools are not subject to significant public oversight and do
not have the same obligations as public schools to provide services to all
students with all educational needs. Private schools may specialize in
particular kinds of learning disabilities, and may reject students whose
disabilities do not fit within their area of specialization or whose disabilities are too serious to be accommodated by the private school.55 Public
schools do not have this option. In addition, we now expect that most
children with disabilities will be integrated within the regular classroom,56 so that public school teachers may need to teach a broad range
and ever-changing student population with a variety of disabilities.
Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that some parents may
find a private school that, in their view, offers a better or more specialized program for their child. But this observation may be made about
parents of all children, regardless of whether they have “special education” needs. That is one reason many parents are prepared to spend in
excess of $30,000 per year tuition for their child to attend the most expensive private schools. In contrast, the average funding provided in the
Ontario public school system was approximately $11,209 per pupil in
2012-2013.57 The fiscal reality is that some private schools will be able
55

Hensel, supra, note 10.
O. Reg. 181/98 (Identification and Placement of Exceptional Pupils), s. 17 provides:
When making a placement decision … the [special education placement and review]
committee shall, before considering the option of placement in a special education class,
consider whether placement in a regular class, with appropriate special education services, (a) would meet the pupil’s needs; and (b) is consistent with parental preferences.
57
This average is based on adding the foundation grants (Primary (JK to Grade 3)
$5,528.94, Junior and Intermediate (Grades 4 to 8) $4,602.92, Secondary (Grades 9 to 12)
$5,747.53), which represented 46.4 per cent of school board funding, and all other capital and
special-purpose grants. The special-purpose grants include grants specifically provided to
supplement special education programs. It is important to remember that these “average” per-pupil
grants are just that — averages — and do not reflect either the variability across the province of the
funding flowing to school boards or the actual amount spent by boards on a per-student basis. School
boards generally spend more than the average per-pupil amount on students receiving special
56
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to outspend public schools on a per-pupil basis. Ordering public funding
for a private school education that does not parallel the public system is
not a reasonable accommodation to access the public system; it is instead
an award of an entirely different educational benefit and may even be an
entirely different type of service.
These concerns are compounded by the Tribunal’s order that the
tuition be paid not only for Grade 4 (the DC1 was only a two- to
four-month program) but from Grades 4 to 12, a total of nine years. It is
interesting to examine how the Tribunal arrived at this result. While the
case was presented as a denial of access to the public education system,
the only remedy ever sought by the complainants was payment of private
school tuition. Jeffrey Moore left the public school system at the end of
Grade 3 in 1995, but his Human Rights Code complaint against the
District School Board was first filed in May 1997.58 By this time,
accommodation of Jeffrey in the public school for Grade 4 was a moot
point since he was already completing Grade 5 at the private school. The
43 days of hearing before the Tribunal were drawn out over a number of
years (2001, 2002 and 2005) and the reasons of the Tribunal were not
handed down until December 21, 2005, by which time Jeffrey had
already completed Grade 12. Clearly these kinds of protracted legal
proceedings are wholly inadequate if the real goal is to find an
appropriate accommodation for a disabled child within the public school
system. The inference here is that the Human Rights Tribunal, which has
no expertise regarding either education or special education, may not be
the appropriate tribunal to be making these kinds of decisions. Instead,
these proceedings should be brought before a specialized tribunal that
can quickly assess parent complaints and order an appropriate placement
for the student within the public school system. Such specialized
processes do exist.59 For example, Ontario legislation provides for a
education programs and services, with the actual amount spent reflecting the cost of programs and
services for their individual needs. For a detailed explanation of Ontario’s funding model, see
“Education Funding, Technical Paper, 2012-13, Ministry of Education”, <http://www.edu.
gov.on.ca/eng/policyfunding/funding.html> [hereinafter “Education Funding Technical Paper”].
58
The complaint was amended in August 1999 to add the Ministry of Education as a
respondent (Moore SC, supra, note 4, at para. 3).
59
The process which existed in British Columbia in 1995 provided for an appeal to the
School Board pursuant to s. 11 of the School Act, S.B.C. 1989, c. 61. This appeal process was
replaced in 1996 by R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 412, ss. 11-11.8, which established a formal process for
appeal of certain s. 11 board decisions to a Superintendent of Achievement within the British
Columbia Ministry of Education. If it had been determined that the pre-1996 appeal process was
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two-stage appeal process that includes an informal appeal to a Special
Education Appeal Board that can make recommendations to the school
board, and a formal appeal to a Special Education Tribunal that involves
a hearing under the Statutory Powers Procedures Act60 as prescribed by
the Education Act.61
The primary reason the hearing before the Tribunal took so long was
because of the “systemic discrimination” complaints brought against the
Ministry. The Supreme Court was critical of this aspect of the Tribunal
hearing, stating that
it was unnecessary for [the Tribunal] to hold an extensive inquiry into
the precise format of the provincial funding mechanism or the entire
provincial administration of special education in order to determine
whether Jeffrey was discriminated against. The Tribunal, with great
respect, is an adjudicator of the particular claim that is before it, not a
Royal Commission.62

By turning itself into a “Royal Commission” and allowing the hearing to run for years, the Tribunal itself made it impossible to provide the
only remedy that would achieve substantive equality: access to an appropriate program in the public school system that met the requirements of
reasonable accommodation. Damages should not be provided in lieu of
accommodation because of delays brought in commencing the claim or
because the Tribunal took years to hear and decide the case.
We recognize that an order requiring the school district to provide
Jeffrey with better accommodation would have been of little practical
benefit, as Jeffrey had already graduated from Grade 12 by the time the
Tribunal issued its decision. The Supreme Court may well have been
aware of this and tacitly applied the principle that “every right should have
a remedy” when it upheld the Tribunal’s private school tuition award in
this case. But if so, then it would have been preferable for the Court to
clearly articulate this as the basis for its decision, and to indicate that this

inadequate, there may have been some basis for proceeding before the Human Rights Tribunal
instead. Neither the Tribunal nor the Supreme Court of Canada, however, gave any consideration to
the adequacy of the appeal process in place in 1995.
60
R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22.
61
Ontario Education Act, supra, note 6, s. 57. The process is described in detail in Brenda
Bowlby et al., An Educator’s Guide to Special Education Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book,
2010), at c. 9 and c. 10. See also Eaton, supra, note 30.
62
Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 64.
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was an extraordinary remedy made necessary as a result of the numerous
and very lengthy delays in the proceedings before the Tribunal.
Another concern is the Tribunal’s decision that once Jeffrey left the
public school system in Grade 4 for the intensive remediation offered by
the private school, there was no obligation for him to return to the public
system after his learning skills improved. The Tribunal’s reasons for this
were that the private school staff advised Jeffrey’s parents that Jeffrey was
never ready to return to the public school system, and the Tribunal
concluded that “[t]he Moores were entitled to accept this advice from
professionals who had worked closely with Jeffrey, understood his needs,
and whom they had come to trust”.63 According to the Tribunal, therefore,
once a student is sent to private school, it is the staff of that school — who
have a direct financial interest in the tuition paid to the private school —
who decide whether and when a child is ready to return to the public
school system. It would not be surprising if private school professionals
are of the opinion that the program that they provide is superior to the
program provided by the public school system and will recommend that
the child remain with the private school. If they did not believe this they
could hardly justify charging parents tuition.64
Our point, however (and this brings us back to the substantive issue),
is that whether the private school program is superior to the public school
program is the wrong question for the Tribunal to ask. The question for
the Tribunal is to determine the appropriate accommodation for Jeffrey,
and to order that that accommodation be provided within the public
school system. If the accommodation cannot be provided within the public school system (for example, because of financial, human resource or
other limitations), then it is not a reasonable accommodation. Where,
as in Ontario, the public school system is statutorily required to provide education to all students, including students who require special
education, accommodation in a private school is never a reasonable
accommodation.
There are additional reasons why ordering payment of private school
tuition is, in our opinion, bad policy. First, the Tribunal tuition payment

63
Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at para. 976; see also para. 979: “Parents of a vulnerable
special needs student are entitled to rely on the advice of the experts providing services.”
64
One might also question the effectiveness of the private school’s intensive remediation
program if its professionals were of the opinion that Jeffrey could never be reintegrated into the
public school system, even with appropriate accommodation.
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order presents the school board with a “zero-sum game”. No matter what
accommodation the board is prepared to offer, if the accommodation is
not 100 per cent of what the Tribunal holds (some years later) should
have been provided, the school board becomes responsible for 100 per
cent of the cost of private school tuition. The DC1 program was only of
two to four months’ duration with a two-year follow-up. Nevertheless,
because Jeffrey instead enrolled in private school and stayed in private
school to Grade 12, the Board was ordered to pay the full tuition amount
for all of those years. If the accommodation offered by the school board
is less than adequate, the appropriate remedy is to require the school
board to offer better accommodation, a remedy that may cost the board a
fraction of the private school tuition.65
Second, the Tribunal order establishes a financial incentive to both
parents and school boards that may undermine their efforts to arrive at
the appropriate accommodation for special-needs students. While accommodation is generally accomplished successfully and with full
cooperation between parents and school board professionals, there are
certainly instances where parents and school board professionals disagree
about the appropriate program or service.66 This is especially true in circumstances like the Moore case, where the Tribunal itself acknowledged
that there was an “educational debate” and “no consensus among experts” on the best way to teach children with dyslexia.67
The potential availability of reimbursement for full private school
tuition could provide an economic incentive to those relatively affluent
parents who can afford the initial financial outlay of tuition to transfer
their child to the private school system and to decline offered programs or
services from the public system that, in the parents’ view, fall short of
what is available in the private school.68 If the parents are determined
to send their child to the private school, there is an incentive to act

65
Even the American IDEA legislation indicates that reimbursement of private school costs
may be reduced in cases where a tribunal finds that the school district has provided a child with
some special education services but concludes that these services are inadequate: Forest Grove,
supra, note 15, at 242.
66
Eaton, supra, note 30, at paras. 60, 77, 79.
67
Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at para. 1013 and Moore SC, supra, note 4, at paras. 12-13.
68
Indeed, there is some evidence that this has been the effect of tuition payment orders
under IDEA. See, e.g., Hensel, supra, note 10, at 345.

(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d)

MOORE V. BRITISH COLUMBIA: A GOOD IDEA?

251

unilaterally and bring a Human Rights Code complaint to recoup the cost
of private school tuition.69
Conversely, school board officials could avoid their duty to accommodate students with disabilities by offering to pay private school tuition
to a parent who, in the school board’s view, has unrealistic expectations
of the public system. If we are serious about accommodating children
with disabilities in the public system, then we should not permit public
school boards to avoid this responsibility by paying to send children with
disabilities to private schools. Indeed, in direct contrast to the United
States IDEA legislation, Ontario legislation does not permit public school
boards to pay private school tuition as a means of providing special education programs. School boards must “provide or enter into an agreement
with another board to provide … special education programs and special
educations services for its exceptional pupils”.70 There is no authority to
enter into such an agreement with a private school.
The incentive to school boards to decline accommodation would be
compounded if, as originally ordered by the Tribunal in this case, the
Ministry of Education is also responsible for the payment of the private
school tuition. To the extent that the tuition payments come directly from
provincial budgets rather than the school board budget, school boards
could actually save money by refusing to accommodate students with
special needs within their schools.
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the Tribunal had gone
too far in ordering the Ministry liable for any damages. While the Court
recognized that the “District’s budgetary crisis was created, at least in part,
by the Province’s funding shortfalls”,71 this did not negate the fact that it is
the District School Board that has the ultimate responsibility for allocating
whatever resources it has in a non-discriminatory fashion: “it was the
69
If you think that private school vouchers are a good public policy (and many people do),
this would not be the best way to implement such a policy because it makes the voucher available
only to those parents who can afford to pay the private tuition upfront and hope to be reimbursed.
Less affluent parents who cannot afford the initial outlay of tuition will have no choice but to remain
in the public system. If private school vouchers are to be made available, they should be available to
all parents without regard to their ability to pay private tuition in advance of a hoped-for damages
award.
70
Ontario Education Act, supra, note 6, s. 170(1)7 (emphasis added). The Quebec
Education Act, supra, note 21, s. 213 does authorize school boards to make agreements with
privately funded schools for the provision of instructional services and/or for “the provision of
student services and special educational services, literacy services or popular education services”.
71
Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 54.
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District which failed to properly consider the consequences of closing the
Diagnostic Centre or how to accommodate the affected students”.72
(ii) Systemic Remedies
This then brings us to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
to reverse the two “systemic” remedies ordered by the Tribunal against
the Ministry. The funding mechanism employed by the province —
“block funding” versus “incidence funding” — was a central issue at the
Tribunal and resulted in one of the Tribunal’s systemic orders against the
province. The Supreme Court rejected the Tribunal’s order that the Ministry “make available funding for SLD students at actual incidence
levels” on the basis that the connection between the province’s funding
mechanism and the closure of the Diagnostic Centre “is remote, given
the range of factors that led to the District’s budgetary crisis”.73 As explained below, any funding mechanism can result in higher or lower
funding depending on the level of funding and a host of other variables
that must be taken into account. The Court also recognized the province’s
interest in establishing a funding mechanism that will “ensure that districts do not have an incentive to over-report Severe Learning Disabilities
students, so long as it also complies with its human rights obligations”.74
This point merits further discussion because it has wider implications
for a variety of large government programs. While education funding is a
highly complex policy area with multiple funding mechanisms at play,
the following simplified explanation may be helpful to understand this
issue. “Incidence funding” requires the school board to identify and report the actual number of students with severe learning disabilities
(“SLD”) within the board, and funding by the province is based on the
number of SLD students reported by each board multiplied by a perstudent grant.
The per-student grant generated by incidence funding is not “customized” to the needs of a specific student, but is a fixed per-student amount
set by the province. Accordingly, the total funding received by the school
board will depend upon the grant amount set by the province: higher perpupil grants will result in more funding, while lower per-pupil grants will
72
73
74

Id.
Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at para. 65.
Id.
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result in less.75 While special education grants must be spent on special
education, the grants generated are not earmarked for any particular student, and the District School Board is responsible for allocating whatever
revenue is generated by these grants among all of the special education
students in the District.
The difficulty with incidence funding was that it required the school
board to provide the province with a claim for every SLD student to
qualify for supplemental funding, and these reports consumed professional resources that could have been better spent providing services to
the student. In addition, it was difficult for the Ministry to come up with
a clear, concise definition of eligibility for SLD funding, which made it
difficult for the Ministry to verify the funding claims made by the District Board.76 Definitions could not be as simple as a diagnosis, because
many learning disabilities, including dyslexia, are of varying severity;
some students with dyslexia will have a mild learning disability, while
others with the same diagnosis will have a severe learning disability, a
distinction that may not be apparent until a child matures.77 This definition/verification issue became a concern as the number of SLD students
being reported by some school boards began to escalate rapidly. Finally,
there was evidence that the incidence of SLD students was fairly uniform
across the province,78 so it made more sense to dispense with the costs
(both financial and time) of providing and verifying the claims, and just
provide all boards with stable funding based on the uniform incidence of
SLD students. This is referred to as “block funding”. Like incidence
funding, the amount of revenue generated by block funding depends
primarily on the grant rate set by the province. It also depends on the uniform incidence level chosen by the province. The uniform incidence
level depends in turn on how SLD students are defined.79 There is nothing inherent in either funding mechanism to ensure any particular level
75

Prior to the establishment of provincial grant based funding formulas, most school boards
were funded primarily from local property taxes, and revenue was tied to assessment wealth;
assessment-rich school boards were able to spend considerably more money per student than
assessment-poor school boards at the same or lower tax effort. The ability to fund different levels of
spending was not related to student need, see OECTA v. Ontario, [2001] S.C.J. No. 14, [2001]
1 S.C.R. 470 (S.C.C.) [“OECTA”].
76
Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at paras. 199, 218-219.
77
Id., at para. 10 and Moore SC, supra, note 4, at paras. 7, 10-13, 20, 27.
78
Moore SC, id., at paras. 54-55.
79
Assuming that an objective definition could be found, the “actual” incidence level would
also depend upon how “SLD” is defined by the province.
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of funding, nor does one mechanism guarantee a higher level of funding
than another.
This account is a simplified explanation of two funding mechanisms,
and the funding mechanism actually employed by the British Columbia
government had certain features of both. The specific details of these
mechanisms cover many pages of complex regulations. Details aside,
there are three points to remember, whichever funding mechanism is
used: (1) school boards have finite budgets that are established by the
province, which sets the grant rate; (2) it is the responsibility of the
school board to figure out how to allocate this finite budget that it receives from the province; and (3) the school board will not have enough
money to provide all the educational programs and services that parents
want or education experts recommend.80
Education funding is a multibillion-dollar endeavour. In 2012-2013,
for example, funding to school boards in Ontario through the provincial
grant formula amounted to nearly $21 billion.81 Of this amount, over
$2.5 billion was earmarked specifically for special education programs
and services.82 Over 300,000 students (out of a total of 1.8 million) in
Ontario’s publicly funded system receive special education programs and
services. The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently held that equality in the design of such broadly based government programs does not
require perfect correspondence.83 It is unrealistic to demand that any
province accurately calculate the “actual incidence” and individual needs
of these hundreds of thousands of students and base its allocation of billions of dollars in special education funds to school boards on such
individualized assessments.
80
District School Boards are not permitted to run deficit budgets without provincial
approval: B.C. School Act, supra, note 21, s. 127(2). The same requirement applies in Ontario: see
Ontario Education Act, supra, note 6, s. 232(3), (4). See also Ward v. Ontario (Attorney General),
[2003] O.J. No. 935, 104 C.R.R. (2d) 189 (Ont. S.C.J.), in which public school trustees brought an
unsuccessful Charter challenge to these provisions.
81
Education Funding Technical Paper, supra, note 57, at 13.
82
Id., at 29. Since most special education students are integrated within the regular
classroom, they are also the beneficiaries of the grant money that funds all other educational
programs such as classroom teachers, education assistants, textbooks and learning materials,
classroom supplies, etc. While special education grants can be used only for special education
programs and services, special education students (in both integrated and congregated placements)
do access programs and services available to all other students.
83
Martin v. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board), [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003]
2 S.C.R. 504, at para. 82 (S.C.C.); Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85,
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at para. 55 (S.C.C.).
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While a recital of the recent history and details of Ontario’s funding
formula is beyond the scope of this paper, Ontario’s experience with
allocating special-education funding to school boards based on individual
actual incidence claims by school boards was very similar to that in
British Columbia. Following the introduction of the new education grant
formula in 1998, Ontario tried to establish a process that would enable it
to fund severe learning disabilities on an actual incidence basis. In order
to provide funding on an “actual incidence level”, the provincial
government had to establish a process for validating or verifying school
board claims, as the fairness of the allocation depends on the application
of criteria, the accuracy of claims and the capacity of boards to submit
claims for all potential claimants. Ontario’s validation process evolved
over several years,84 but was criticized by school board officials and
professional educators because it diverted human and financial resources
from providing programs and services to students, and because consistent,
objective verification of actual incidence levels across boards proved
elusive. Based on this experience, Ontario largely abandoned the claimsbased process in 200585 and has moved toward a system of proxy or
“block” funding that better ensures that the needed grants are provided in
a timely and efficient manner and that available funds go to programs and
services rather than administration.
The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal had also concluded
that the Ministry’s responsibilities extended to ensuring the appropriateness of special education programs and services at the individual level,
holding that the Ministry “failed to ensure that Jeffrey’s needs were appropriately accommodated in the District” and that the Ministry “does
not audit to ensure that districts’ special programs meet the needs of individual students or groups of students”.86 Based on this finding, the
Tribunal ordered the government to “establish mechanisms for determining that the support and accommodation services delivered to SLD
students are appropriate” and to “ensure that all school districts have in
84
Student Focused Funding – Legislative Grants for the School Board 1998-1999 Fiscal
Year, O. Reg. 287/98 [revoked]; Student Focused Funding – Legislative Grants for the School Board
2003-2004 Fiscal Year, O. Reg. 139/03 [revoked].
85
Grants for Student Needs – Legislative Grants for the 2004-2005 School Board Fiscal
Year, O. Reg. 145/04 [revoked]; Grants for Student Needs – Legislative Grants for the 2005-2006
School Board Fiscal Year, O. Reg. 400/05; Grants for Student Needs – Legislative Grants for the
2006-2007 School Board Fiscal Year, O. Reg. 341/06 [revoked].
86
Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at paras. 827, 880.
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place a range of services to meet the needs of SLD students”.87 This order would have centralized the structure for the delivery of special
education by requiring the Ministry to assume a direct role in the design,
delivery, oversight and audit of individual special education programs
and services, a role that is now undertaken by local school boards.88
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed this ruling without any
comment or analysis beyond its brief explanation as to why systemic orders were not an appropriate remedy in this case.89 This particular
remedy, however, merits more analysis because it demonstrates one of
the dangers of giving administrative tribunals the jurisdiction to order
broad systemic remedies that can fundamentally reshape important social
programs subject to judicial review only on the basis of reasonableness.
As a general policy, every province in Canada has determined that
special education is most appropriately delivered and monitored at the
local level by the school board.90 This decentralized structure reflects the
consensus view that the needs of individual students are best addressed at
the local level, where school board staff of professional educators and
consultants who are most familiar with a student’s individual strengths
and needs can make decisions about appropriate special education services for that student. It also recognizes that school boards have
experience and expertise in designing and delivering special education
programs.
The decentralized structure for the delivery of special education also
allows school boards to develop special education placement options,
programs and services in a manner that reflects local needs, resources
and circumstances. In Ontario,91 school boards have different approaches
to placement options and offer different programs and services based on
various local and board-specific factors. For example, where a congregated class is the appropriate or preferable placement, it may be easier

87

Id., at paras. 827, 880, 1015.
We would argue that the Ministry had already established “a mechanism for determining
that the support and accommodation services delivered to SLD students are appropriate” by
establishing local school boards staffed by professional educators to make these decisions at the
local level — but this is exactly the mechanism that the Tribunal found to be a source of systemic
discrimination.
89
Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at paras. 64-66.
90
See provincial legislation, supra, note 21.
91
As indicated above, there are over 300,000 students across 72 school boards receiving
special education services and programs in Ontario’s public school system.
88
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for school boards in urban areas to congregate students in self-contained
classes than it is for school boards in rural northern areas where two or
more students with a particular type of exceptionality and similar needs
may live a considerable distance away from one another. School boards
may also have differing philosophies when it comes to placement options
for exceptional students.
There is a considerable risk that shifting responsibility to the Ministry for the oversight and evaluation of all individual special education
programs would lead to an ineffective and unworkable structure overseen
by officials who are not in a position to know a student’s individual
needs or strengths, or the resources that may be available to any particular board given the wide variety of circumstances across the province.
Yet the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal seems to have perceived greater centralization of special education as a panacea, even
though it referred to no evidence and offered no reasoned analysis as to
how the shift in responsibility from the school board to the Ministry
would eliminate the discrimination it identified. The Tribunal, which acknowledged itself as having “no inherent expertise in the appropriate
pedagogical approach to remediating SLDs”,92 imposed a systemic remedy without any evidence to support, or any consideration of, the efficacy
or utility of such a systemic change.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that this remedy did not even
meet the reasonableness standard to which the remedial decisions of the
Tribunal were subject.93 While we agree with that assessment, we note
that challenging a tribunal decision on the basis that it is unreasonable is
a notoriously difficult standard to meet. While reasonableness may be the
appropriate standard in cases where a tribunal acts within its area of primary expertise and imposes a remedy that has little or no impact beyond
an individual employer, landlord or service provider, it is not appropriate
in cases where a tribunal imposes a broad systemic remedy that requires

92

Moore BCHRT, supra, note 3, at para. 1014.
Moore SCC, supra, note 1, at paras. 55, 57. The standard of review for remedial
decisions of the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal is “patently unreasonable”. See
Administrative Tribunals Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 45, s. 59. “Patently unreasonable” has been assimilated
or “collapsed” into the single standard of reasonableness (see Dunsmuir, supra, note 53, at paras. 44,
45). Section 45.8 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 also establishes “patent
unreasonableness” as the standard of review for Human Rights Tribunal decisions: “[A] decision of
the Tribunal is final and not subject to appeal and shall not be altered or set aside in an application
for judicial review or in any other proceeding unless the decision is patently unreasonable.”
93
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vague but fundamental changes to the delivery of public programs and
services and that will have a broad impact beyond the parties to the particular proceeding. In such cases tribunals should be held to a standard of
correctness, just as courts are when they impose similar remedies under
the Charter. The degree to which public school governance should be
centralized or decentralized has been a perennially controversial issue.94
The Moore case demonstrates the potential danger of permitting such
issues to be determined by a single Human Rights Tribunal chair in a
single case, so long as she is not acting unreasonably. The public policy
stakes are just too high, and this sort of systemic remedy, if it is within
the jurisdiction of a Human Rights Tribunal at all, should be reviewable
on a correctness standard.95

IV. CONCLUSION
All parents want the best possible education for their children. The
unavoidable reality of the public school system, however, is that, whatever its many strengths, school boards have the unenviable task of
allocating their limited budget in a world of unlimited demand. That is
why the substantive and remedial analyses in cases like Moore are inextricably intertwined. If, on the one hand, the goal of special education
programs is to provide children with disabilities access to the public
school system, then the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Moore
does little to advance that cause. Neither the Court’s substantive analysis
of “meaningful access” nor its approval of the reimbursement of
nine years of private school tuition provides guidance to tribunals tasked
with determining how a child with disabilities might be accommodated
within the public school in future cases where parents and the school
board disagree. If, on the other hand, our society believes that a private
school voucher is an appropriate alternative to accommodation within the
public school system, provincial governments should be encouraged to
94
See OECTA, supra, note 75; Public School Boards Assn. v. Alberta, [2000] S.C.J. No. 45,
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 409 (S.C.C.); Ontario Public School Boards Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General),
[1997] O.J. No. 3184, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 346 (Ont. Gen. Div.). All of these cases were unsuccessful
challenges to government measures providing for greater centralization of education governance and
funding.
95
We recognize that such a change may require statutory amendment in jurisdictions like
Ontario and British Columbia where the statute itself provides for judicial review on the basis of
reasonableness.
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enact American-style voucher legislation to offer parents this alternative
without the need for costly and time-consuming litigation. In our view,
these two visions of education are not compatible, and if we choose the
latter route we must accept the impact that the resulting diminished resources will have on the capacity of public schools to accommodate
those students with disabilities remaining in the public system. We must
also accept the loss of inclusiveness and diversity in the public system
that would result from the withdrawal of students with disabilities from
public schools. The preferable route is to require that disagreements
about special education programs be dealt with expeditiously and by specialized tribunals with sufficient expertise to realistically distinguish
between access by a single student to the best possible education that
money can buy, and access to a general public school education that must
serve and accommodate all students.

